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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES T FLINDERS,
Plaintiff-Respondent
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
vs
Case No. 870091CA
LEON ROPER,
Defendant-Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal is granted to
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(c), Utah
Code, and pursuant to Section 78-6-10(2), Utah Code.
This case involves the appeal from a trial and

judgment

entered by the Small Claims Department of the Fifth Circuit
Court, Sandy Department, entered

in a civil case wherein the

plaintiff claimed to be entitled to money damages by reason of
the Defendant's alleged "negligent inspection" of a motor vehicle
later purchased by the plaintiff from a third-party.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.

Whether

a purchaser

of

a motor

vehicle

in an

"as is"

condition may have recourse against the person who performs a
"safety inspection" upon the vehicle for mechanical defects in
the vehicle, when there was no "privity" of contract between the
purchaser and inspector and when the purchaser's claimed loss is
not related to "safety" issues (such as would be the case if he

1

or a third-party had been injured by reason of a defective part
purportedly the subject of the "safety" inspection) , but rather
are for "fitness" of the purchased motor vehicle.
2.

Whether the Plaintiff's own negligence in continuing to

drive

to

precludes

Montana
totally

with
or

the

partially

"stuck"
his

parking

recovery

brake

under

the

provisions of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act.
3.

Whether the Plaintiff can recover for mechanical defects in

the steering when there was no direct evidence that the inspector
had negligently failed to inspect the same and when Plaintiff's
sole evidence came

from

the interested, hearsay statement of a

mechanic in Montana who indicated the alignment
4.
sold

needed repair.

Whether the Plaintiff's failure to join the merchant who
him

the

allegedly

defective

motor

vehicle

precludes

recovery,
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 70A-2-316, Utah Code, pertaining to the exclusion or
modification of warranties of goods purchased pursuant to the
Uniform Commercial Code, is determinative. That statute provides
in part:
. . .

(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as
is", "with all faults" or other language which in
common understanding calls the buyerfs attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain there is no
implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there
2

is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed
to him; . .
Emphasis added.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a civil case, in which the Plaintiff-Respondent
[hereinafter referrred to as "Buyer"] seeks monetary damages
against the Defendant-Appellant

[hereinafter referred to as

"Inspector"] for mechanical defects in a used vehicle, purchased
in an "AS IS" condition from a third-party [hereinafter referred
to as

"Seller"].

This case was heard by

the Small Claims

Department of the Fifth Circuit Court, Sandy Department, Gregory
Skordas, Judge Pro Tempore. From a judgment in the amount of
$479.97 entered in favor of the Buyer, the Inspector appeals.
In November 1986 the Buyer purchased a used motor vehicle,
in an "AS IS" condition, from a third-party not named as a
co-defendant
Inspector
without

in

this

litigation.

Prior

to that

sale, the

acting at the request of the vehicle seller and
any

contact

or

contract

with

the

buyer,

the

Buyer---performed the "safety inspection" upon the vehicle and
issued the Utah Highway Patrol window sticker for the vehicle.
The Plaintiff took possession of the vehicle and drove the
vehicle. Shortly thereafter, on a trip to Montana, the oil
pressure light on the vehicle came "on" and the Buyer pulled off
the

road

near

McCammon,

corrected, the Buyer

Idaho. When

started

that

difficulty

was

to move the vehicle, but the

3

"parking" brake was holding the vehicle. The Buyer thought he had
worked "free" the stuck parking brake and continued his journey
to Montana.
Upon

arriving

in

Montana,

the

Buyer

felt

that

the

"alignment" was defective and in need of repair. He took the
vehicle to a mechanic in Montana, who advised him to have the
alignment repaired

at a cost of $191.00.

Upon returning to Utah, the Buyer inspected the brakes and
found they allegedly needed repair: the emergency brake cable was
stuck and the rear brake shoes were severely "burned". He made
those repairs (or obtained estimates therefor) and filed this
action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The purchaser of a used motor vehicle, sold in an "AS IS"

condition, has no recourse against the person who performed a
"safety inspection" on the vehicle at the request of the seller
prior to the sale.
2.

The negligence of the purchaser in continuing to drive the

vehicle after the brakes had stuck precludes his recovery.
3.

The trial court improperly considered incompetent, hearsay

testimony as evidence of the Inspector's alleged breach of his
duty of care.
4.

The failure to join the seller of the allegedly-defective

vehicle as a party precludes recovery.

4

ARGUMENT
I
THE PURCHASE OF THE VEHICLE IN AN "AS IS" CONDITION PRECLUDES
RECOURSE AGAINST THE PERSON WHO PERFORMED A "SAFETY INSPECTION"
ON THE VEHICLE WHEN THERE WAS NO "PRIVITY OF CONTRACT" BETWEEN
THE PURCHASER AND THE INSPECTOR AND THE PURCHASER'S ALLEGED
LOSS IS FOR BREACH OF WARRANTIES AND NOT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
It is undisputed that the subject vehicle, a used "Mountain
Fuel Supply Company" van, was purchased from a third-party in an
"AS IS" condition. Prior to the consumation of that purchase, the
Inspector had

at the request of the third-party seller, but

without any "privity of contract" with the Buyer

performed the

"safety inspection" upon the vehicle as required by the Utah
Highway Patrol and Utah statute.
The Court must keep in mind that the Buyer's claim here is
NOT for injuries sustained as a result of an accident with that
vehicle, which accident might have been caused by the unsafe
condition of the vehicle. Rather, the Buyer's claim
vaguely pleaded in a "small claims" action

somewhat

is for "negligent

inspection". This claim, together with the evidence and argument
adduced at trial, is perhaps refined into two causes of action:
(A) a "breach of contract" theory; and/or

(B) a "breach of

warranty" theory.
A
The Buyer cannot recover under a "breach of contract" theory
because there was NO CONTRACT between him and the Inspector. The
safety inspection was performed at the request of the Seller.

5

There was no

"privity". The

Inspector

accountable for the alleged "breach"

sought

to be held

had no way of knowing that

the Buyer was relying on the inspection for anything other than
the statutory "safety inspection". The Inspector did not know
that the Buyer was allegedly relying on the inspection for MORE
THAN the limited safety issues; the Buyer was relying on the
inspection

as

an

UNLIMITED

GUARANTEE

that

there

were

no

mechanical defects in the vehicle whatsoever.
It is patently unfair to assess liability, in an amount in
excess of $400, when the Inspector's charge for his "inspection"
is limited, by law, to a mere $10.

6

B
The Buyer should not be able to recover under a "breach of
warranty" theory either. There was simply no "warranty"^.
There was no evidence that there was any "warranty" before
the trial court. In Billings Yamaha vs Rick Warner Ford, 681 P.2d
1276 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that a finding of
breach of warranty cannot be sustained on appeal where there is
no written copy of the warranty in the record and where there was
no

oral

testimony

at

trial covering

warranty's

terms. That

holding is directly on point in this case. The Inspector made no
warrantyl There was no documentary

evidence from the Buyer

as

to what the UHP regulations for "safety inspections" required or

The only "warranty" which would be reasonably implied was that
the vehicle met the UTAH "safety requirements" ON THE DATE IT WAS
INSPECTED. Indeed, the Inspector so testified. To this, the Buyer
presented no rebuttal evidence.
The Buyer did testify that a Montana mechanic advised him
(hearsay) to have the "alignment" repaired at a cost of $191.00.
There was no non-hearsay evidence that the "alignment" parts
were defective.
[The Buyer didn't bring into court any of the allegedly
defective parts.] Furthermore, there was no evidence that
"alignment" is an item for which the Inspector was inspecting.
The Inspector submits that under the Regulations issued by the
Utah Highway Patrol, the "alignment" of the front wheels is not
an item which is required to be inspected" and for which a
"rejection" sticker may be issued!
Furthermore, it must be remembered that by the time the
Montana mechanic saw the vehicle's alignment, it had been driven
over "five hundred miles" and that by the time the Buyer examined
the brakes, the vehicle had been driven over 1000 miles. If the
brakes stuck in the area of McCammon, Idaho (distance from Salt
Lake City: approximately 150 miles), those brakes would have been
stuck for 850 miles! It is no wonder that upon examination they
were "burned"!
7

didn't require. 2 The only real evidence was that the Inspector
had performed the inspectionl The mere existense of the "safety
inspection sticker" in the window of the used vehicle, purchased
in an "AS IS" condition, should not be deemed to give rise to a
warranty of the dimension framed by the trial court.
The Buyer should not be able to recover from the Inspector
under a "breach of warranty" theory when the Buyer was PRECLUDED
BY LAW from recovering against the Seller of the vehicle. The
inspection was performed, at the Seller's request, BEFORE THE
SALES TRANSACTION! The vehicle was sold in an "AS IS" condition.
The Buyer knew of that limitation and probably paid a lower
purchase price because of it. The Buyer took possession of the
vehicle with the mechanical defects, if any, inherent in the
vehicle.
Under Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code [codified
in Utah statutes at 70A-2-316], the Seller was insulated from the
Buyer's claim. That statute provides in part:

(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as
is", "with all faults" or other language which in
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain there is no
implied warranty; and
2

The sole evidence was: (1) that Mr Anderson of the UHP found
insufficient evidence to conclude the Inspector improperly
inspected the vehicle; (2) that the regulations required the
emergency brake to be tested while in second or third gear, which
test WAS performed by the Inspector; and (3) the Inspector's
testimony concerning the thickness of the brake shoe linings on
the date he inspected them.
8

(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract
has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an
examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed
to him; . .
Emphasis added.
The Buyer could have examined the vehicle for any defects.
The "AS IS" condition, by law, alerted him to the possibility
there may have been problems. The Buyer chose to ignore the
statutory obligations placed upon himl He could have examined the
brakes. [Bear in mind that it is his testimony alone as to the
"defective" condition of the brakes. He personally changed the
brake shoes upon the return from Montana. He had begun the repair
with the intent of replacing a "seal",

which, he felt, might

have been damaged "during the inspection." While changing the
shoes is relatively routine, changing a brake cylinder "seal" is
relatively involved. The "seal", which is almost fully enclosed
wi thin

the

brake

cylinder,

is

fully

protected:

there

is

practically no way a "seal" could be damaged during a routine
safety inspection

which would entail only the removal of the

wheels (tires and brake drums) and a quick examination of the
thickness of brake shoe linings. In any event, if the Buyer is so
competent to change the "shoes" and/or the "seals", why didn't he
make a quick inspection BEFORE he purchased the vehicle? And
after he determined they were so defective, why didn't he take a
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picture of them, or have a friend examine them (so

as

to have a

third-party verification of the defect), or, as a minimum, "save
the old parts" as reapir shops are often requested to do?]
In W. R. H., Inc. vs Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42
(Utah 1 9 8 1 ) , the Utah Supreme Court, quoting

the California

Supreme Court, stated:
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the
manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury
when he buys a product on the market. He can, however,
be fairly charged with the risk that the product will
not match his economic expectations unless the
manufacturer agrees that it will.
633 P.2d

at

47. Emphasis

"manufacturer"

added. Such

is the case here: the

(Inspector) of the "product"

(the

inspection)

should not be "charged with the risk" that the product will "meet
the expectatins" of the Buyer unless the Inspector agrees that it
wi 11. The Inspector made no such agreement! He merely performed
the inspection, as required by law.
Certainly

if the law precludes recovery against the Seller

of the vehicle for mechanical defects, certainly the law should
preclude recovery against the Inspector, who, in relationship to
the Buyer, stands "behind" the Seller. The Buyer should not be
allowed to "jump" over the insulated Seller and receive recovery
against the Inspector, whose fee was fixed by statute and who had
no idea the Buyer was relying on the inspection for that expanded
purpose.
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This Court must consider the effect an affirmance of the
trial court's judgment will have upon the "safety inspection"
program. If the judgment stands and the Court of Appeals holds
that an inspection station is thus financially responsible to the
purchaser of that vehicle for mechanical defects, stations will
be hesitant to perform the inspections

particularly for the

miniscule fee allowed by statute. This will have the effect of
rendering it impossible to obtain a legitimate safety inspection,
except and unless there is paid a "scalped" price not authorized
by statute. [The financial liability for the inspector is simply
too great for the meager profit, if any, he obtains.] Such a
result can hardly be intended by the Legislature when the safety
inspection program was adopted I
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE BUYER IN MISUSING THE VEHICLE
The Buyer testified that the brakes of the vehicle locked up
outside of McCammon, Idaho. The Buyer testified that he "backed
up" to get them unlocked. He then drove to Montana and returned
to the Salt Lake City area, where he examined the rear brakes and
found the rear brake shoe linings to be "burned."
The Inspector testified that when he examined the vehicle,
the brake shoe linings were "six thirty-secondths" (6/32nds) and
"four

thirty-secondths"

(4/32nds)

of any

UHP "minimums" are 2/32nds of an inch.]
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inch thick.

[The

To drive

the vehicle with

"locked" rear brakes

such a

distance must certainly constitute "contributory negligence".
[The Buyer testified that h e , as a heavy equipment operator,
would know that the brakes were locked because of the "feel". To
this was be pointed out that he was driving a "brand new" (for
him) vehicle, the "feel" of which he couldn't have developed
such a short

in

time.] Under the terms of the Utah Comparative

Negligence Act, Section 78-27-37 et seq, Utah Code, the trial
judge should have taken into account the "comparative negligence"
of the Buyer and should have reduced

or denied altogether

the amount awarded to the Buyer. The trial judge did not do such;
he awarded the full claim to the Buyer.
Furthermore,

the

Utah

Supreme

intentional misuse of a vehicle

Court

has

held

is a defense to a claim

that
for

personal injuries incurred from an allegedly-defective product
under a "strict liability" theory. Ernest W. Hahn vs Armco Steel
Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). Such should also be the case when
there are no claimed "personal injuries" and the Buyer's misuse
of the product aggravated, if not totally induced, the defective
condition (i.e. "burned" brakes).
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Ill
THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY BASED HIS DECISION ON
INCOMPETENT, HEARSAY EVIDENCE
The Buyer testified that upon arrival in Montana, he felt
the tires were "wearing" badly. He took the vehicle to a mechanic
in Montana, who told him---hearsay

that the "alignment" needed

repair. With the Buyer's permission, the mechanic
$191.00

for a cost of

repaired the alignment of the vehicle. The Buyer sued

for recovery of this

and other

costs.

There was no evidence presented that "alignment" is an area
for which the Inspector should have inspected. There was no
evidence that the Inspector could have "rejected"^ the vehicle
for this reason. On the contrary, the Inspector asserts that the
Utah Highway Patrol regulations do not allow him to "reject" the
vehicle for problems with the "alignment" which merely cause the
tires to "wear" improperly.
If the Buyer incorrectly assumed that such was "covered"
under the Utah Highway Patrol "safety inspection", it should be
he

not the Inspector-—who should suffer economically from that

mistaken assumption!

The Buyer bases his entire case against the Inspector on the
existence of the "safety inspection" sticker in the window. There
was no showing that the Inspector should have "rejected" the
vehicle
and placed a "rejection" sticker in the window (or at
least refused to place an "inspection" sticker in the
window)---for problems with the "alignment".
13

IV
THE FAILURE TO JOIN THE SELLER OF THE VEHICLE
PRECLUDES JUDGMENT AGAINST THE INSPECTOR
This

action

was

filed

and

prosecuted

by

the

parties

themselves as a "small claims" case. As untrained laymen, they
were

obviously

unaware

of

the

legal

principles

which

are

determinative of their respective rights.
Notwithstanding

the ignorance of the parties, the trial

court is obligated to follow the law. Section 78-6-8, Utah Code,
pertaining to "small claims court" cases, allows the proceedings
to be

"informal, with

the sole

object

of dispensing

speedy

justice between the parties. . ." Nevertheless, the trial court
should have taken into account the statutory prohibition against
recovery (under Section 70A-2-316) discussed in Point I, above.
The trial court should have also

taken into account the

provisions of Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides in part:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not deprive the court of jursidiction over
the subject matter of action shall be joined as a party
if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, . . . If he has
not been so joined, the court shall order that he be
made a party. . .
Emphasis added.
Although the Seller did appear at the trial and did testify
on

behalf

of

the

party-litigant.
proceedings- — o r

Inspector,

The
at

trial
least

the

Seller

judge, even
at
14

some

was

not

before

point

he

prior

joined

as

began

the

to

their

conclusion

should

have

realized

that

there

would

be

a

"substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations".
The trial judge should have realized that the Seller was an
indispensible party to the action, if for no other reason that to
provide "contribution", if any, based upon the relative fault, if
any, of the Seller and Inspector, pursuant to Section 78-27-39 et
seq, Utah Code, Certainly the Seller of the vehicle

perhaps

making several hundred dollars in profit from the sale of the
arguably-defective vehicle

should help participate in the

payment of an adverse judgment to a much greater extent that the
poor Inspector whose "profit", if any, in the transaction is
limited to the statutory $10.
CONCLUSION
The Inspector cannot be held financially liable for the
mechanical

"fitness"

of

the

vehicle,

purchased

from

an

intervening third-party in an "AS IS" condition. Such was not the
purpose for which the vehicle was "inspected". There was no
"privity of contract" or contact between the Buyer and Inspector;
the Inspector had no way of knowing the Buyer was ostensibly
relying on the "inspection" for that expanded purpose.
The Buyer waived his rights to recover

for mechanical

defects in the vehicle by purchasing it in an "AS IS" condition.
He waived his rights by not adequately examining the vehicle
prior to the purchase thereof.
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The Buyer's own "negligence" in driving the vehicle should
have diminished

if not precluded altogether

recovery for the

burned "brakes".
There was no evidence that "alignment" and "improper tire
wear" are the proper subject of a "safety inspection".
The trial court improperly based its judgment on incompetent
(there

was

no

showing

that

the MONTANA

mechanic

had

any

particular expertise in evaluating whether the "alignment" was
defective under UTAH "safety inspection" standards), hearsay
evidence.
The failure of the trial court to join as a party-litigant
the Seller who sold the vehicle precludes recovery against the
Inspector.
Wherefore, the judgment entered by the trial court must be
set

aside,

judgment

Defendant-Appellant

should
and

be

entered

costs

be

in

favor

awarded

of
to

the
the

Defendant-Appellant (Inspector) for prosecuting this appeal. In
the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial court
for joinder of the Seller.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of July, 1987.

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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